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Knowledge, Legitimation and the Politics of Risk:  
The Functions of Research in Public Debates on Migration 
 
 
There is a considerable body of literature exploring how far, and under which conditions, 
knowledge is drawn on to shape policy.
1
 However, scholars have tended to focus on the 
impact of research on policy output; they have overlooked the more symbolic role that 
knowledge can play in lending credibility to policy positions (Meyer and Rowan, 1991; 
Feldman and March, 1981). Where contributions have inquired into this more symbolic 
function of knowledge in politics, they have tended to focus on knowledge utilization within 
the administration, rather than in the context of political mobilization (Knorr 1978; Weiss 
1980). The question of how knowledge is utilized as a source of legitimation in party politics 
has been largely ignored.  
 
This article explores a number of theses about the uses of knowledge in politics. Given the 
paucity of literature on this form of knowledge utilization, it is necessary to cast the net wide, 
drawing on rather disparate areas of research. Particularly promising are sociological theories 
of the role of science in risk construction, as well as the growing literature on political 
communications. However, these bodies of research seem to yield rather conflicting 
conclusions. On the one hand, the political communications literature points to the ‘dumbing 
down’ of political debates. It argues that policy issues are discussed in a simplistic and 
dramatized way in public fora, implying a limited role for expert knowledge as a strategy of 
political mobilization (Poggi, 1990; Peterson, 1996; Meyer, 2002). On the other hand, a 
number of prominent sociologists have suggested that expert knowledge has become more 
crucial than ever in influencing public debates in late modern societies (Beck 1996; Giddens 
1994a; Luhmann 1991). The key point here is that many areas of contemporary political 
debate are characterized by competing constructions of risk, rather than more prosaic 
struggles over material resources. And under these conditions, expert knowledge acquires a 
more decisive role in defining and justifying possible policy responses, not just at the level of 
expert policy-making but also in public debates.  
 
I argue that despite the prima facie contradiction between the two theses, they are not 
necessarily incompatible. Research does appear to play a role in public policy debates, but the 
context and nature of its utilization are highly selective. In line with the ‘dumbing down’ 
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thesis, knowledge clearly needs to conform to the criteria imposed by the mass media, which 
militates in favor of novelty, drama and scandal. But research results can and often do meet 
these criteria. Analyses of the politics of risk, meanwhile, provide more insight into the 
context of utilization: knowledge is likely to be used in areas characterized by scientific 
uncertainty and the potential for risk construction, rather than more traditional conflicts over 
distribution or values.  
 
I build on these contributions to advance four central claims about knowledge utilization in 
political debate. First, knowledge claims are most likely to be invoked in political debate 
where participants accept the legitimacy of technocratic, as opposed to democratic, modes of 
justification. This is typically the case for areas of risk, where expert knowledge (as opposed 
to arguments about interests or values) is considered crucial for evaluating the desirability of 
different policy options. However, the second point is that in areas of high political salience, 
such knowledge claims are rarely deployed in a politically neutral way. Political elites seek to 
use knowledge to substantiate their political preferences, while the mass media is keen to 
draw on knowledge in a way that exposes political transgressions. Thirdly, the persistence of 
epistemic uncertainty in areas of risk undermines the authority of science as a basis for 
decision-making. Thus while policy-makers are keen to legitimize decisions through drawing 
on research, they are also aware of the limitations of knowledge in predicting potential 
outcomes; and, moreover, that politicians (and not science) will be attributed responsibility 
for future damages caused by bad decisions. Taken together, these three points generate a 
fourth claim: that there is a paradoxical disconnect between the ritualistic acceptance of 
technocratic modes of settlement, and the limited authority of knowledge in settling disputes.  
 
The article illustrates these points with the case of the utilization of knowledge in the politics 
of migration. This is a politically salient area, with extensive possibilities for the exposure of 
scandal, and one that is characterized by epistemic uncertainty and risk. However, it also has 
strong distributive elements, and touches on a number of value conflicts. It therefore provides 
an excellent case for exploring patterns of knowledge utilization in political mobilization. An 
examination of the political discussion on migration in the UK in 2002-2004 largely supports 
the four claims about knowledge utilization. It also indicates different strategies adopted by 
governments to deal with the disjuncture between expectations about expert knowledge, and 
its ultimate incapacity to underpin risky decisions.  
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Politics and Legitimizing Knowledge 
 
It is worth starting with some general comments about the utilization of knowledge to 
mobilize political support, or what I term ‘legitimizing knowledge’.2 The article focuses on 
research utilization within politics, by which I mean the system of party politics, which is 
engaged in the competitive mobilization of electoral support for the purpose of securing 
political power. This mobilization is achieved through appealing to societal interests and 
laying out programmatic agendas for policy improvements. The precondition for exercising 
power, then, is to secure consent from the public for policies or programs, or to mobilize 
opposition to those of rival parties. Clearly, there are multiple ways in which political parties 
and governments attempt to do this. Drawing on expert knowledge is just one, and not 
necessarily the most appropriate, strategy. But as we shall see, there are circumstances under 
which political actors consider it expedient to appeal to this form of justification.  
 
There are two ways in which we can understand expert knowledge as a source of 
legitimization in politics. First, knowledge can lend authority to political actors, or endow 
them with what has been described as ‘epistemic authority’ (Herbst, 2003). The perception 
that an individual, party or government possesses reliable, relevant and detailed knowledge 
creates confidence that their decisions will be well-founded. The second way in which 
knowledge can legitimize political actors applies not so much to how it endows them with 
legitimacy, but rather the ways in which it can legitimize particular claims about policy 
problems. Scientifically based empirical or analytical claims can substantiate and thereby 
enlist public support for particular policy positions. Under what conditions, then, might such 
strategies of knowledge utilization be deployed in political debates? Here we turn to the two 
theses about knowledge utilization. 
 
The Dumbing Down of Politics 
 
There has been a discernible tendency in political science literature towards pessimism about 
the role of knowledge in political debate. Many commentators have pointed to a growing gap 
between politics as it is discussed in public arena, and the highly specialized, technical basis 
for actual policy-making (Poggi, 1990). Indeed, there appears to be a paradox between the 
increasing dependence of policy on expert research, and the simultaneous simplification of 
political rhetoric (Peterson, 1996). Followers of this school argue that advanced industrial 
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states have experienced radical change towards highly technical and specialized forms of 
policy. Policy decisions and implementation need to draw on detailed and often highly 
technical knowledge.  
 
However, a number of scholars have argued that this trend has not been accompanied by 
greater emphasis on knowledge and expertise in politics. Instead, there has been a radical 
‘uncoupling’ of technocratic policy from political debate (Poggi, 1990, p. 189). Just as policy 
becomes more complex, public debates on politics appear to be increasingly irrational, 
emotive and personalized. Much of the literature on simplification in politics locates its 
source in the impact of a media which has come to dominate political communication (Meyer, 
2002). The mass media plays a central role in determining the political relevance – and 
resonance – of issues. And it serves as the central channel of communication between the 
public and politics. Politics largely relies on the mass media to convey messages about public 
opinion – it acts as ‘a sounding board’ for feedback on public responses to policy positions 
and strategies (Koopmans, 2004). And politicians also depend on the media to communicate 
their positions to the public. Indeed, the media has largely ‘colonized’ politics, forcing the 
latter to acquire its values, or else risk areas of politics being lost to view (Meyer, 2002).  
 
The mass media clearly has its own criteria for selecting what is considered to be 
newsworthy. Influenced by a logic of maintaining the interest of its readers or audiences, it 
tends to be biased towards more sensationalist, emotive stories (Hildgartner and Bosk, 1988). 
Typical criteria for defining the news value of stories are novelty, drama, conflict and 
controversy, human interest, and the prominence of the people involved. Stories must also be 
presented in compressed and simplified form, often involving the use of misleading 
metaphors, dichotomies and stereotypes (Cook, 1998, p. 113; Mueller, 1973). This often 
involves detaching events from their context and placing them within a stylized narrative. 
Such narratives tend to become fixed, so that the media ignores news or information that does 
not fit them. 
 
Media colonization has also engendered a preoccupation with the disclosure of scandal. 
Scandal refers to ‘actions or events involving certain kinds of transgressions which become 
known to others and are sufficiently serious to elicit a public response’ (Thompson, 2000, p. 
13). In the context of politics, such scandals often revolve around the betrayal of expectations 
about what is considered to be moral or responsible behavior – whether on the part of 
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individual politicians, or governments. Scandals involving corruption or abuses of power or 
the transgressions of individual politicians tend to get the most prominent coverage. But the 
mass media also frequently sees its role as exposing scandals linked to the failed delivery of 
political promises, or public expectations about the role and functions of the state. 
 
If these observations are correct, we would expect the media to couch political debate in 
simplistic terms, in a way that militates against the reporting of expert knowledge. Because of 
the bias towards drama, novelty and simplification, one could predict that the media would 
limit the coverage of research, and attach little weight to expert knowledge. By extension, 
given the media’s ‘colonization’ of politics, one would expect politics to respond through a 
parallel dumbing down of its political communication, placing limited emphasis on 
knowledge utilization as a mobilizing strategy. 
 
Expert Knowledge and Risk Construction 
 
A second body of literature on knowledge in politics would suggest a rather different 
tendency. The starting-point here is the observation that the subjects of political debate have 
fundamentally changed over the past three or more decades. Politics in late modern societies 
mobilizes support on the basis of response to rather abstract risks, most notably environmental 
damage, certain branches of medical research, and the impact of new technologies (Beck, 
1996). We can also add risks associated with many areas of foreign and defense policy, 
terrorism, crime and migration, and economic policy (Douglas and Wildavsky, 1982, p. 2).  
 
A number of scholars have questioned how far contemporary conceptions of risk reflect an 
objective change in the nature and scale of threats. Instead, the preoccupation with risk may 
best be understood as a shift in the way dangers are constructed (Smith, 2004; Elliott, 2002, 
pp. 300-1). In other words, risk is an attribution of observers rather than an inherent property 
of politics (Luhmann, 1996, p. 5). Following this constructivist approach, we can characterize 
areas of risk in terms of two features. The first is the question of causal responsibility. In 
contrast to more traditional forms of threat, risks are constructed as manufactured, as the 
result of decisions. Niklas Luhmann clarifies this point this through contrasting the concept of 
risk to that of danger (Luhmann, 1991). In the case of danger, damages are perceived as being 
externally caused and thus outside the control of decision-makers. But in areas of risk, future 
damages can be brought about by decisions that are taken now. Thus decision-makers assume 
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responsibility for preventing or mitigating damage, with important consequences for political 
debates (Bovens and ’tHart, 1996).  
 
The second point concerns the appropriate means of dealing with risk. Anthony Giddens 
argues that unlike dangers linked to distribution, policy areas characterized by risk cannot be 
addressed through material interventions. While the types of danger endemic to modern 
welfare states could be addressed through traditional forms of insurance against poverty, ill-
health or old age, areas of risk display different features. They are characterized by 
uncertainty over their scale and consequences, as well as controversy over the appropriate 
means of controlling them (Giddens, 1994b, pp. 152-3). Rather than relying on practical 
knowledge and experience, such risks are constructed and vary according to often highly 
abstract expert knowledge. One consequence is that political debates become far more 
susceptible to influence from science. Expert knowledge has a privileged role in defining the 
scale and nature of phenomena associated with risk, and how best to address it. Thus late 
modern societies are characterized by an unprecedented dependence on science and 
technology for determining the risks and consequences associated with political action 
(Jasanoff, 2006, pp. 23-4; Levy, 1990, pp. 127-9).  
 
To be sure, reliance on expert knowledge is not limited to areas of risk. Policies in typically 
distributive areas, such as welfare or taxation, also depend on specialized data and studies to 
guide the elaboration of policy. The difference is that the deployment of knowledge claims in 
areas of risk becomes a central criterion for settling debates. Unlike in policy debates 
revolving around rival interests or values, it is not sufficient to justify claims on the basis of 
popular support, or to settle disputes through bargaining (see Barry, 1990 on these different 
modes of settlement). In areas of risk, participants in the debate are likely to acknowledge the 
authority of technocratic, rather than democratic, modes of justification. 
 
Of course, the notion that debates may be settled through technocratic deliberation becomes 
more problematic in contentious policy areas (Radaelli, 1999). Technocratic modes of 
settlement may prevail in relatively non-politicized policy areas, which are not the object of 
public claims-making. But where an issue is the object of rival political claims, it is unlikely 
that knowledge will be deployed in a neutral way, or that disputants will accept without 
question the authority of scientific evidence as a criterion of settlement. Instead, participants 
will seek to deploy expert knowledge to substantiate particular claims. In the case of politics, 
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strategies for deploying knowledge will depend not just on expected policy impacts or what 
will ‘work’. They will also be influenced by the concern to mobilize popular support, through 
rhetoric and decisions (Brunsson, 2002). In the case of the mass media, as we saw, the 
selection of which types of knowledge to deploy will depend on the potential of research 
findings to meet criteria of novelty and drama, and especially to reveal government 
transgressions. The different constellations of technocratic/democratic modes of settlement, 
and high/low political salience, are depicted in Table 1.
3
 
 
-  Table 1 about here   - 
 
The propensity to use knowledge to substantiate rival claims is augmented by a second factor: 
the acknowledged fallibility of scientific knowledge, especially in areas of risk. Areas of risk 
are almost by definition characterized by contestation about the validity of scientific claims. 
In such areas, many of the objects of inquiry are particularly difficult to measure, and enjoy 
limited possibilities for experimental forms of testing that employ trial and error based 
methods (Rüdig, 1993, p. 25; Giddens, 1994a, p. 220). The resulting heterogeneity and often 
incomparability of research results limit the possibilities for building up a more robust and 
uncontested ‘acquis’ of knowledge. This lack of a solid body of knowledge can imply that 
public opinion and the media are more open to influence from the latest findings. It also 
provides greater scope for the exploitation of research findings. Users of knowledge – 
whether these are operating within politics, business, the media or interest groups – can 
instrumentalize new research findings to substantiate divergent claims about the phenomena 
in question (Beck, 1996, p. 167). 
 
At the same time, however, the acknowledged uncertainty of such diagnoses creates risks in 
the utilization of knowledge to secure political legitimacy. Policy-makers will be held 
accountable for the damages caused by what (in retrospect) can be seen to have been wrong 
decisions, belated reactions, or a failure to act (Luhmann, 1991, p. 117). This implies an 
important discrepancy between the systems of politics and science. The system of science 
does not – and probably cannot – evaluate the validity of its findings on the basis of their 
practical implications. By contrast, politicians are held accountable for such choices, even 
where they must be taken without adequate scientific knowledge.  
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The insufficiency of expert knowledge as a basis for decision-making in areas of risk also 
implies a discrepancy between knowledge utilization on the part of incumbents, and critics of 
their policies. Governments are likely to want to avoid placing too much faith in scientific 
research, aware of the fallibility and ultimate unaccountability of such findings. By contrast, 
opposition parties and the media may display no such qualms. They may deploy scientific 
evidence to support claims without being held accountable for the implications of decisions 
based on such knowledge. And they will be keen to criticize governments for taking decisions 
which, in retrospect, can be depicted as irresponsible. This asymmetry between decision-
makers and their critics creates scope to portray governments and their decisions as 
scandalous. Governments can hardly avoid taking risks; but the media and opposition parties 
are quite free to depict (the outcomes of) such decisions as betrayals of trust (Luhmann, 1991, 
p. 117). In this sense, the mass media’s penchant for scandal is quite compatible with insights 
about the politics of risk: damages brought about by political decisions are prime objects for 
scandalization.  
 
Where scandals revolve around decisions taken (or not taken) in areas of risk, the media is 
quite likely to draw on research to help reveal government transgressions. Expert knowledge 
can help describe or explain the damages caused, or can cast doubt on the scientific basis of 
government decisions. This implies that expert knowledge can meet the criteria of 
newsworthiness, and may indeed serve as a means of exposing scandal in policy areas 
characterized by risk. 
 
Four Claims about the Political Utilization of Knowledge 
 
I would like to draw on these insights about risk, political communications and knowledge 
utilization, to advance four claims.  
1. Research findings are likely to be invoked in political debates where participants 
accept the legitimacy of technocratic modes of justification. This will be the case for policy 
areas characterized by risk, i.e. where there is (a) uncertainty about the nature and scale of 
potential damages caused by policy choices, and (b) dependence on expert knowledge to 
assess such threats. Such areas can be contrasted to those revolving around competing 
interests or values, which are typically subject to democratic modes of settlement.  
2. Where such policy areas are politically salient, it is unlikely that knowledge claims 
alone will be authoritative in settling disputes. While participants may accept the relevance of 
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technocratic modes of justification, they will seek to deploy competing constructions of risk 
to substantiate preferences generated by non-technocratic considerations. The dynamics of 
selecting expert knowledge will vary between politics and the mass media.  
 In the case of politics, the instrumentalization of expert knowledge will be influenced by 
perceived possibilities for political mobilization.  
 In the case of the mass media, it will be determined by the potential for research findings  
to meet the criteria of novelty and drama, exposing scandal in the form of political 
transgressions.  
3. While politics is keen to draw on knowledge to underpin the legitimacy of its 
decisions, it is likely to be cautious about relying on science as a basis for decision-making. 
This is both because of the acknowledged fallibility of knowledge in areas of risk; and 
because of the unaccountability of science in taking responsibility for damages caused by 
risky decisions. This creates an asymmetry between knowledge utilization on the part of 
incumbents and their critics. 
4. The combination of these three points generates a paradox. On the one hand, 
participants in political debate acknowledge the authority of science as a mode of settlement 
in areas of risk. But on the other, they also recognize its epistemic short-comings, and are 
quite willing and able to deploy rival knowledge claims to substantiate preferences arrived at 
on other grounds. In short, disputants are engaged in a ritual of knowledge-based deliberation, 
whilst remaining profoundly ambivalent about the authority of science in settling disputes. 
 
 
Legitimizing Knowledge in the Politics of Migration 
 
These ideas can be better illustrated by looking in detail at knowledge utilization in the 
politics of migration. There are a number of reasons why migration policy provides a good 
subject for our inquiry. First, migration issues have frequently been characterized as a typical 
subject for risk construction (Beck, 2001; Huysmans, 1998; Gammeltoft-Hansen, 2006). 
Decisions taken on the admittance and integration of immigrants clearly have major societal 
impacts. But knowledge about migration – in particular its causes, scale, and impact on host 
societies – displays the feature of epistemic uncertainty (Sciortino, 2000). This is most 
patently the case for research on the causes and dynamics of international migration, as well 
as the phenomenon of irregular migration (Geddes, 2005, pp. 330-1). At the same time, 
though, migration policy is not a pure case of ‘risk politics’, but is characterized by contention 
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over resource distribution (Freeman, 1995), especially in the area of the admission of new 
migrants, and their access to welfare resources and employment (Bommes and Geddes, 2000). 
Migration policy also raises important value conflicts, invoking competing ethical notions of 
duties to non-nationals (Boswell, 2000), and different conceptions of national identity and the 
criteria of membership (Favell, 2001). This implies that in many areas of migration policy, 
democratic modes of justification are likely to prevail over technocratic ones. Issues about 
how to distribute welfare resources between residents and newcomers, for example, clearly 
cannot be settled by expert knowledge. The combination of these features of risk, distribution 
and value conflict therefore make migration an excellent area for comparing patterns of 
knowledge utilization prone to different modes of settlement. 
 
Second, migration policy issues are clearly highly salient in public debates. They are a 
popular topic of mass media reporting, and in many countries have become the object of 
highly populist forms of political mobilization (Faist, 1994). This often takes the form of the 
scandalization of betrayed political promises, especially over the control of unwanted 
immigration, irregular labor or asylum. The policy area therefore offers a good case for 
examining claims about how different actors deploy knowledge in contentious policy debates.  
 
The UK offers a very good example of these tendencies. Its popular media, and especially the 
press, show a high level of preoccupation with political scandal, including on migration 
issues. And public debates on migration are characterized by conflicts over both distribution 
and values, and risk construction. The analysis that follows focuses on examples from 
political debates on immigration policy in the United Kingdom (UK) between 2002-2004. 
Over this period, of the nine prominent migration policy issues surfacing in public debates in 
the UK, three were triggered by, or involved the extensive use of, research.
4
 The first was a 
debate on the ‘real’ level of immigration to the UK; the second a discussion about the 
economic impact of immigration in the UK; and the third a debate on the impact of European 
Union (EU) enlargement on immigration from Central and East Europe to the UK. The three 
cases allow scope for comparing knowledge utilization under conditions of different levels of 
risk. While the first and third issues involved estimates of future migration flows, and were 
scientifically uncertain, the second question of the economic impact of immigration has been 
the object of a relatively solid body of empirical research.  
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The analysis of these three cases is based on a variety of sources from the print media and 
politics. Press coverage includes reporting in the Daily Mail, an anti-immigrant tabloid paper; 
the Daily Telegraph, an anti-immigrant broadsheet; and the Independent, a broadsheet with 
more liberal views on immigrants. Other sources are the House of Commons and Westminster 
Hall debates; speeches by the Prime Minister, Home Secretary and Conservative 
spokesperson for Home Affairs; daily press briefings of the Prime Minister’s Official 
Spokesman (PMOS); and press releases from No. 10 Downing Street, the Home Office, and 
the Conservative Party.
 
 
 
Migrationwatch and the Debate on Immigration Statistics 
 
In Summer 2002, a recently founded think tank called Migrationwatch UK launched a report 
on immigration statistics. The report claimed that official figures on immigration issued by 
the British Home Office seriously underestimated the true level of immigration. Based on 
official immigration statistics, estimates of irregular entry and overstay, and extrapolation 
from previous trends, the report suggested that ‘at least 2 million non EU citizens per decade’ 
were expected to immigrate to the UK in coming years (Migrationwatch 2002). 
 
The report was immediately picked up by several newspapers, notably the right of center 
broadsheet the Daily Telegraph. On 5 August it ran an article entitled ‘2m migrants for 
Britain in the next decade’, and in its editorial of the same day used these findings to criticize 
the government’s immigration policy. According to the Telegraph, the Migrationwatch report 
illustrated ‘how startlingly high levels of immigration to these shores now are’, and 
demonstrated the need for more data: ‘To work out what we want, we need the facts’ (Daily 
Telegraphy 2002). Over the next few months – until the end of 2004 – the paper cited findings 
or comments from Migrationwatch in 21 out of a total of 32 articles dealing with the level of 
immigration and asylum flows into the UK. On two occasions they published articles by 
Andrew Green, the head of Migrationwatch. And on three further occasions, the paper 
devoted special articles to cover the launch of new reports from the think tank. The Daily 
Mail, a popular right of center tabloid, was another paper to report on the findings of 
Migrationwatch, though less extensively than the more ‘highbrow’ Telegraph. It cited reports 
or comments from the think tank in 19 articles between the launch of the August 2002 report 
and the end of 2004. The right-wing press seemed to hail Migrationwatch’s reports as a brave 
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attempt to bring honesty into the debate on an important issue, which was otherwise 
suppressed by a ‘canting, smug liberal elite’ (Daily Mail, 2004b).  
 
Migrationwatch figures certainly did not go unchallenged. The liberal press and the 
government were highly skeptical about its methodology, not to mention what it considered to 
be the think tank’s right-wing populist agenda. Labour Member of Parliament (MP) and 
former immigration minister Barbara Roche criticized the organization for lacking 
independence and objectivity. ‘This organisation appears determined to peddle exaggeration 
and distortion to an audience of certain newspapers only too keen to embrace its message ... 
We need a strong, academically grounded and truly independent organisation that can act as a 
counterweight in the media and beyond’ (Waugh, 2003). Responding to the attack, the 
Telegraph in particular was keen to bolster the credibility of its source: it stressed the fact that 
its head, Andrew Green, was a former UK Ambassador; and its co-founder was David 
Coleman, a demographer from Oxford University (Johnston, 2002a). Arguably, the continual 
use of statements from Migrationwatch also filled a gap left by Conservative Shadow Home 
Secretary Oliver Letwin and his successor David Davis, who over this period appeared 
unwilling to be too directly associated with the more extreme anti-immigration positions of 
the right-wing press. Indeed, Conservative speeches and press briefings on migration and 
asylum over this period are notable for their omission of any reference to the Migrationwatch 
figures, although the extensive coverage of Migrationwatch certainly bolstered their critique 
of Labour Party policy.  
 
Despite this reticence, parliamentary debates over the following two years suggest that media 
coverage of Migrationwatch had a discernible impact on the migration debate within the 
political system. In March 2003 a Conservative backbench MP, Nicholas Soames, launched a 
parliamentary debate on immigration statistics. He announced that the  ‘conspiracy of silence 
about immigration, which has lasted for a generation, must end ... we need proper, accurate 
and truthful figures’. Citing Migrationwatch estimates, he challenged the government to 
provide estimates for ‘clandestine arrivals’, arguing that ‘[t]he British people have a right to 
be told how many more immigrants are expected to arrive over the next 10 years’ (House of 
Commons, 2003a, pp. 2-4). The immigration minister Beverley Hughes, while stating that ‘we 
do not accept Migrationwatch UK’s immigration projections as accurate’, nonetheless 
accepted the need for improvements in statistics (indeed the debate coincided with a national 
statistics quality review on migration). The issue of migration statistics featured prominently 
 13 
in subsequent debates. During a Westminster Hall debate on immigration the following day, 
one Conservative MP stated that ‘Migrationwatch ... is the independent organisation that we 
can rely on for sensible statistics on migration’; another referred to ‘the important work done’ 
by the organisation’, although the Liberal Democrat Home Affairs spokesman considered that 
‘its figures have not been independently verified’ (House of Commons, 2003b, p. 7). Concern 
about Migrationwatch criticism also influenced the Office of National Statistics in their 
decisions on releasing data. The Telegraph reported in August 2003 that ‘officials wanted the 
ONS to hold back some potentially embarrassing figures’ in order ‘to avoid renewed attacks 
from Migrationwatch’ (Sparrow, 2001).  
 
Migrationwatch figures were not explicitly cited in parliamentary debates after March 2003, 
and the Conservative Party continued to be reticent about drawing explicitly on their findings. 
Nonetheless, it is fairly clear that they had a substantial impact on the debate. They provided 
the opportunity for the right wing media and Conservative Party to put concerns about the 
scale of immigration back on the agenda, in particular raising questions about the 
government’s credibility in providing accurate information on it. Andrew Green was the ‘man 
who set off [the] immigration timebomb’ (Johnston, 2002b). 
 
The Migrationwatch episode provides an intriguing example of how politics and especially 
the media seek to couch claims in terms of expert knowledge. Participants in the debate were 
ostensibly accepting a technocratic mode of justification, emphasizing the decisive role of 
expert knowledge on migration figures in settling disputes. And indeed, the question of 
estimating and projecting immigration flows is in many ways a classic area of risk. The 
debate drew on estimates of irregular entry and overstay, phenomena on which there are no 
reliable data, and which are extremely difficult to observe. It also revolved around the even 
more scientifically problematic task of projecting future migration flows.  
 
However, it is quite clear that the Daily Mail and the Telegraph were invoking these findings 
to substantiate other sorts of claims. Migrationwatch figures were used to bolster a generally 
anti-immigration stance, and, perhaps more importantly, to disclose government 
transgressions. Indeed, most attention was given to findings that appeared to expose 
government failings: its dishonesty over claims about the level of immigration, its inability to 
control influx, or its prevarication over the negative social impacts of immigration. This is 
evident from the quantitative break-down of media interest, which shows that the most 
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extensive coverage of research was on Migrationwatch’s reports on the ‘true’ level of 
immigration (see table 2). It is also supported by the qualitative analysis, which shows a 
striking preoccupation with revelations about government deceit and ineptitude. The pattern 
of reporting clearly supports the claim that the media will draw on knowledge where it can 
expose political scandal. 
 
-  Table 2 about here   - 
 
The episode also reveals some discrepancy between knowledge utilization on the part of 
politics and the media. The Conservative Party appeared to be cautious about drawing on 
Migrationwatch figures as a means of substantiating their critique of the government. This 
implies the exercise of some caution in being associated with a group whose epistemic 
credibility, and whose political correctness on migration issues, was very much questioned by 
the more liberal press. In this sense, it was the media rather than politics that most directly 
utilized research to undermine the credibility of the government. The press was clearly less 
concerned about source credibility than the Conservative Party. 
 
Projections of East-West Migration Flows after EU Enlargement 
 
In June 2003, the Government defended in parliament its decision not to impose barriers on 
the free movement of workers from the 10 new candidate countries joining the European 
Union on 1 May 2004. While most other EU countries had decided to introduce a moratorium 
of up to seven years on free movement of workers from the new member states, the UK 
government decided to grant access to its labor market from the outset. This decision became 
the subject of intense party political discussion, with Home Office sponsored research 
becoming a central theme of parliamentary debates. 
 
The issue first rose to prominence in Summer 2003, then largely disappeared from media 
attention, to re-emerge as an important issue between February – May 2004 in the run-up to 
EU enlargement. In the first major parliamentary debate on the question in 5 June 2003, the 
Conservative MP Richard Spring drew on the findings of a survey of migration intentions 
carried out by the International Organization for Migration. He claimed the research found 
that ‘several million people plan to move to the west’, and that the UK would be the third 
most popular choice, after Germany and Austria (House of Commons, 2003c). The Labour 
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MP Alan Whitehead mocked the ‘spectacularly poor pieces of empirical evidence brought to 
bear’ by Mr. Spring, who was ‘making a series of hypothetical points’; a position that found 
support from another Conservative MP, Anne Winterton, who agreed ‘let us throw away all 
those polls ... they are not worth the paper that they are written on’ (House of Commons, 
2003c). Nonetheless, despite widely held skepticism about survey-based findings, there 
appeared to be a striking level of confidence in the ability of (good quality) research to 
provide accurate projections. Indeed, the Home Office was criticized for having failed to 
produce the research it had commissioned on this topic in time for the debate. The Home 
Office research was seen as providing crucial evidence. Spring complained that the 
Government had ‘not published a full and up-to-date report into the likely effect’ of free 
movement, with the ‘last study on this matter that the Government published ... [dating] as far 
back as July 1999’. The Government had therefore ‘failed the House by not providing the 
information necessary for debate on this important subject’ (Richard Spring, House of 
Commons, 2003c). The critique was not therefore targeted at the idea of basing policy on such 
projections; but rather at the fact that the Government had so far failed to produce these 
figures. 
 
However, once the Home Office commissioned report was published, it was criticized by the 
Conservative Party as being unrealistically low in its projection of annual inflows to the UK 
of 5,000 – 13,000 a year (Dustmann et al., 2005). As one MP declared during a debate on the 
Bill, ‘The Home Office’s predictions on new immigrants are wrong and have been 
challenged, not least by the Home Secretary’s own advisers.’ Writing in the Telegraph, 
Andrew Green described the estimate as ‘absurdly low’ (Green, 2004). Even the Liberal 
Democrat Mark Oaten argued in parliament that ‘it would make more sense to wait and base 
the policy on fact rather than prediction’ (Mark Oaten, House of Commons, 2004). Rejecting 
the findings, the Conservative Party stuck to the claim that ‘there are millions of people in 
these various eastern European countries who could come’ (Daily Mail, 2004a).  
 
David Blunkett, the Home Secretary, was keen to distance himself from these estimates. 
When challenged by the Conservative Shadow Secretary on Home Affairs, David Davis, to 
defend the projections offered in the report, the following exchange ensued: 
David Blunkett: I have never said that there would be only 13,000 people. 
David Davis: Yes you did. 
Blunkett: No, I have not. We published independent research on the website last summer, with 
its methodology. The figure of 13,000 has never crossed my lips (House of Commons, 2004). 
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Later in the debate Blunkett remarked that: 
I have no intention of being held to the 13,000 figure: if I had, I would be a very foolish 
politician, because in the future the only issue raised in this House would not be whether those 
people were good for our country or had paid their tax or national insurance, but whether I had 
got the figure wrong.  
 
Indeed, the Government and Labour MPs preferred to draw on other sources to justify 
predictions that there would not be a mass influx of workers after 1 May. The PMOS pointed 
to the experience of previous EU enlargements, when fears about mass influx had proven to 
be unjustified; only on one occasion did he refer to the Home Office research as an additional 
reason to doubt concerns about mass influx.
5
 In his key-note speech to the CBI, Blair did not 
refer at all to possible levels of influx, instead emphasizing arguments about skills gaps and 
the positive impact of immigration (Blair, 2004).  
 
This second episode offers another good example of knowledge utilization in an area of risk. 
Policy planning based on projections of future migration flows faces huge methodological 
problems. If knowledge of the causes of migration flows is already contested, this is the case 
par excellence for projections of flows, and especially attempts to predict movement triggered 
by a change in policy. And yet the implications of such policy are clearly significant, as 
events after May 2004 amply demonstrated.
6
 Both the government and opposition parties 
stressed the importance of producing reliable projections as a basis for policy, thus accepting 
a technocratic mode of justification.  
 
Nonetheless, the episode clearly shows the ambivalence of politics about the authority of 
expert knowledge. While there was a general expectation that well-based decisions should be 
underpinned by research, and the need for expert knowledge was constantly invoked in 
debates, once these estimates were produced there was obvious reticence about placing too 
much faith in them. The government in particular was cautious about being seen to base 
policy on estimates. Once the commissioned study was made available, it played a rather 
limited role in government justifications. The government wanted to avoid being held to 
account for estimates that could subsequently prove to be incorrect. The Prime Minister in 
particular showed a marked preference for other (non-research) sources, notably the 
experience of previous enlargements. 
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Home Office Research on the Economic Impact of Immigration 
 
Between 2002-2004, the Labour Government drew on a number of research reports 
commissioned by the Home Office to justify labor migration policy reforms. They did this 
through high-profile launches of Home Office funded research, and through the continuous 
citing of specific research findings in speeches, policy papers and press releases. One example 
of this is the Home Office’s launch in December 2002 of research it had commissioned on the 
economic impact of immigration. The report, which the Government hailed as ‘independent 
academic research’ (No. 10 Downing Street, 2002), was a summary of three Home Office 
commissioned studies, carried out by scholars from University College London and the 
University of Leicester. In the words of immigration minister Beverley Hughes, the research 
showed that ‘it is simply not true that migrants “take the jobs” of the existing work force. It 
confirms that migrants can add to our economy, expand businesses and create success, jobs 
and opportunities for us all’ (Home Office, 2002).  
 
The research was frequently invoked to support the Government’s new, more liberal policies 
on labour migration. It provided much of the evidence drawn on in the 2002 Home Office 
White Paper; and, more generally, helped substantiate what, in the words of Hughes, ‘marked 
a radical shift in policy, based on a recognition of the positive contribution of migration’ 
(House of Commons, 2003b). It was also drawn on by the pro-immigration Liberal 
Democrats. As the Home Affairs Spokesman Simon Hall put it, ‘All the evidence from the 
Home Office and elsewhere shows that the migrant population coming to the UK is net 
financially beneficial ... Unless people can disprove that, we must be very wary of suggesting 
that migration is not a benefit’ (House of Commons, 2003b). 
 
Probably the best example of a single research finding being drawn on to justify policy was 
the estimate of the fiscal contribution of migrants offered by research published by the Home 
Office in 1997. A report by the Home Office Development and Statistics Directorate in 
collaboration with a centre-left think tank, the Institute for Public Policy Research (IPPR) 
estimated that immigrants in the UK had made a net fiscal contribution of ₤2.5 billion in 
1999-2000 (Gott and Johnston, 2002). This figure was repeatedly referred to in speeches, 
press releases and parliamentary debates (Blunkett, 2002; House of Commons 2002, 2003b; 
No. 10 Downing Street, 2003; PMOS, 2004). The research was also reported in the liberal 
center-left press – the Independent cited these and similar findings on the benefits of 
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migration in five articles between 2002-2004. The IPPR report was subsequently up-dated and 
published during the general election campaign of May 2005. 
 
But the research findings were also queried from a number of directions. During a Press 
Briefing by the PMOS on 5 April 2004, journalists questioned ‘the origin of these figures’, 
including the ₤2.5 billion fiscal contribution, and were simply referred to the Home Office for 
more information. (Interestingly, this figure was not included in the Prime Minister’s key-note 
speech on migration to the Confederation for British Industry (CBI) later that month.) 
Migrationwatch also produced a report challenging the methodology behind this estimate in 
early 2005 (Migrationwatch, 2005). Andrew Green commented that the figure was ‘plucked 
out of a lengthy document, shorn of its necessary qualifications, placed in a prominent 
position in the executive summary and then repeated endlessly – a classic case of spin 
doctoring’ (Johnston 2004). The figures were certainly not accepted as authoritative by 
opponents of the new immigration policy. As the Conservative MP Nick Hawkins put it in a 
parliamentary debate: 
If, as the Government claim, high net migration brings many benefits, they should admit the 
numbers, sell the benefits to the public and bask in the adulation of a grateful electorate for 
providing such a generally beneficial improvement in our way of life. I see no evidence of that, 
because so far they have provided few arguments that mass migration is a good thing, but there 
are many arguments that the numbers put too great a burden on our infrastructure and public 
services, on the poorest people, and on our way of life (House of Commons, 2003b).  
 
However, the notion that immigration was economically beneficial did not appear to be 
fundamentally questioned by most of the political establishment or even the media. The main 
reservation expressed about these findings was that the acknowledged economic benefits of 
migration may be outweighed by its negative social impact. Most opposing the Government’s 
new policy did so not by denying the economic argument, but on the basis that immigration 
risked overburdening social services or housing, and created problems with migration control. 
For this reason, the Conservative leader Michael Howard was convinced that ‘[wh]ile 
migration ... is part of a competitive and dynamic modern economy, immigration to Britain 
cannot continue at its present, uncontrolled levels’ (Daily Mail, 2004b).  
 
It is worth noting that the Prime Minister and his official spokesman hardly referred to 
research findings on the economic impact of immigration. The CBI is continually cited as the 
preferred source for legitimizing government claims about skills shortages, while claims 
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about the economic contribution of immigration are drawn from the Treasury.
7
 This selection 
of sources suggests some caution in drawing on academic research. 
 
Unlike the first two cases, this debate did not revolve around an area of risk. The question of 
the economic impact of migration best fits the category of a distributional policy issue, and it 
is the object of a relatively uncontested body of knowledge. The debate involved not so much 
a dispute over these economic impacts, but rather a struggle over the appropriate mode of 
settlement. The government was keen to settle the discussion through technocratic debates 
about the economic costs and benefits of migration, in the full expectation that it could win on 
these terms. It also displayed none of the caution evident in drawing on estimates in debates 
on EU enlargement, presumably because the body of research on the impact of migration was 
relatively conclusive. By contrast, those opposing the government’s stance sought to avoid a 
discussion based on economic analysis, preferring to depict the issue as a conflict over 
distribution or values, thus implying the legitimacy of democratic criteria for determining 
policy. 
 
This discrepancy was reflected in a pronounced asymmetry in knowledge utilization. While 
the government was clearly keen to invoke expert knowledge, the popular press gave very 
limited coverage to research on the economic impact of migration. Where the Telegraph 
reported on this research, it was to question the relevance of findings that focused solely on 
economic impacts, and which seemed to ignore less tangible social costs. The research was 
considered deficient because it failed to weigh up the economic benefits against other costs 
associated with immigration. So the newsworthy aspect of the research revolved around 
whether the indubitable economic benefits of immigration justified its potentially negative 
societal impacts.  
 
Finally, while the government was keen to draw on expert knowledge, it was also aware of 
criticisms about the narrow, technocratic basis of its arguments on the benefits of migration. 
Indeed, this may explain why more senior political figures were less keen to draw on this 
research to substantiate the case for increased labor migration. As we saw, the Prime Minister 
and his Official Spokesperson preferred to draw on figures from the CBI and the Treasury to 
support arguments about the benefits of migration, rather than academic research. This may 
reflect a concession to the relevance of democratic modes of settlement. Both the CBI and the 
Treasury represented bodies with a broader representational remit than the academics who 
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produced the original study on the impacts of migration. By citing them as the source of 
research, the government could demonstrate a slightly broader base of democratic support. 
 
Conclusion 
 
The literature on political communications is certainly correct in its observation that political 
debate has become simplified and dramatized, and rightly points out its preoccupation with 
scandal. But this does not imply that research is being screened out of political discourse. 
Indeed, the analysis of research utilization in UK debates on migration policy suggests that 
research findings are frequently invoked in political debates, and can be the object of quite 
intensive media interest. I claimed that this was most likely to be the case for policy areas 
characterized by risk, in which those engaged in policy debate accepted the legitimacy of 
technocratic modes of justification. This was certainly borne out in the analysis of migration 
policy debates, in which expert knowledge was frequently invoked by the government, 
opposition parties and the media as an authoritative basis for settling disputes.  
 
The three episodes examined also strongly supported the second claim: that participants 
would make use of research selectively, to substantiate policy preferences embraced on non-
technocratic grounds. In this sense, the acceptance of technocratic bases for settling debates 
was to a large extent ritualistic. Politics was keen to draw on research, or to shift debates to 
technocratic grounds, where the evidence would support its claims. In the case of the media, 
there was a clear interest in research findings that could scandalize political decisions, 
exposing politicians as untrustworthy decision-makers in risky areas of policy. 
 
The empirical analysis also demonstrates how politics may be cautious about depending on 
science as a basis for policy-making. This reflected in part a concern about the epistemic 
credibility of some of the claims asserted by research, and a desire to avoid being seen to be 
too dependent on contested knowledge as a basis for decision-making (as with the study on 
EU enlargement and migration). But it may also have reflected an awareness of the lack of 
ethical credibility of academic sources of knowledge. Senior policy-makers chose to draw on 
research produced by government departments or industry rather than scientists, especially 
where policies had a clear distributional or value component. Such sources were in a sense 
more accountable, produced by actors with a popular mandate, and thus carrying more weight 
in debates settled on democratic, rather than technocratic, grounds. 
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The fourth claim was that these various features of knowledge utilization create a paradox. In 
areas of risk, expert knowledge is attributed a salient role in settling debates, and decision-
makers are under pressure to demonstrate the scientific basis of their decisions. But they, their 
critics and the general public are also aware of the limitations of science in predicting the 
outcomes of decisions, and in making calculations of risk under conditions of uncertainty.  
 
How have governments responded to this paradox? In the case of UK debates on migration 
policy, we discerned three strategies. The first was to accept this ambivalence, simultaneously 
stressing the importance of research but being careful not to rely too heavily on particular 
findings as a basis for policy (as in the case of EU enlargement). But this strategy carries the 
risk that politicians will be seen to be inconsistent or incoherent in their approach towards 
research. An alternative strategy was to draw on more reliable knowledge on a relatively non-
risky aspect of policy in order to shift the balance of potential benefits and costs of the policy 
in question and thereby justify risky policies. This may also create problems if the media and 
opposition expose and challenge this maneuver, as they did in the case of UK debates on the 
economic impact of immigration. Finally, political leaders displayed a penchant for citing 
research results from governmental agencies or influential interest groups. Knowledge 
produced by practitioners arguably avoided concerns about accountability.  
 
It would be interesting to extend this analysis to compare knowledge utilization across 
different policy areas characterized by varying degrees of epistemic uncertainty and risk. 
Analyses of public debates around issues of food safety and the environment certainly display 
a similar ambivalence about the authority of scientific claims as a basis for risky decisions 
(Hajer, 1995; Liberatore, 1999; Smith, 2004). It would also be interesting to compare 
knowledge utilization in countries with different cultures of research. In cases where there is a 
higher level of respect for scientific knowledge, we might expect politics to be less cautious 
about drawing on research to legitimize policies. Indeed, the political culture in countries such 
as France, Germany and Italy does seem to show more deference to expert knowledge. But it 
may equally be the case that such countries face an even starker paradox between, on the one 
hand, high expectations about the role of research; and on the other, the deficiencies of such 
knowledge as a guide to policy-making in areas of risk.  
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Notes 
                                                          
1  Prominent contributions include Weiss with Bucuvalas, 1980; Weiss, 1978; Heller, 1986; Holzner 
et al., 1983; Goldstein and Keohane, 1993.  
2  Expert knowledge in this context refers to the product of research (in fact I use the two terms 
“expert knowledge” and “research” interchangeably). Research, following Stone, is “a codified, 
scholarly and professional mode of knowledge production that has its prime institutional loci in 
universities, policy analysis units of government department or international organizations and 
private research institutes and produced by academics, think tank experts and [policy] 
professionals.” (Stone, 2002, p. 2). The term “science” is used to refer to this mode of knowledge 
production.  
3  The table builds on a similar schema developed by Radaelli (1999), though I posit a rather  
 different outcome for the combination of uncertainty and high salience. 
4  Discussion in the media and parliament over this period were also dominated by the 
government’s handling of the asylum system, and the numbers of asylum applicants in the UK; 
control of irregular labor; the government’s position on EU immigration and asylum policy; the 
introduction of identity cards; and two scandals leading to the resignation of Minister Beverly 
Hughes and the Home Secretary David Blunkett. However, none of these debates involved the 
invocation of research findings.  
5  See PMOS Press Briefings, 19 January 2004; 9 February 2004; 11 February 2004; 16 February 
2004 (available at http://www.number-10.gov.uk). 
6   The lifting of restrictions on labour market access for the newly acceding states did in fact lead to  
 far higher levels of immigration than predicted – over 600,000 nationals for the accession  
 countries had registered as workers in the UK by May 2007. 
7  See, for example, PMOS Press Briefings from 9 February 2004, 16 February 2004, 26 April 
2004; and the PM’s speech to the CBI on 27 April 2004. All can be downloaded from 
http://www.number-10.gov.uk. 
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